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Abstract 
 We analyze the effects of Geographical Indication (GI) labeling on quality choices and 
welfare with two vertically differentiated goods, one labelable, the other not. We consider two 
attributes of these goods: gustatory quality and geographical origin. We investigate two extreme 
cases of the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) label: a denomination standard, which 
guarantees only the origin of the product, without any requirement on production specifications; 
and a minimum quality requirement, which guarantees both the origin and the quality of the 
product. We find that the PDO good is not necessarily the high-quality good. When it is, the 
introduction of the denomination standard causes its quality to decrease. Binding production 
specifications that maintain the quality level of the labeled good adversely affect the PDO firm. 
 
Key words: geographical indication, quality label, endogenous quality choice, product 
differentiation. 
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Introduction 
Third-party standards inform consumers on some quality dimensions of goods, when such 
information is either costly or inaccessible to consumers due to asymmetric information. Many 
such standards, both public and private, exist for food products, and cover different types of quality 
attributes. For example, organic products must comply with production practices defined by public 
standards. Fair-Trade Labeling Organizations International sets international standards for fair 
trade covering both trade and production conditions. The Sustainable Agricultural Network (best 
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known through the certification trademark Rainforest Alliance) defines social and environmental 
standards. Mandatory labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the European Union 
ensures consumers that any unlabeled product contains less than 0.9% of GMOs per ingredient.  
Our focus in this paper is on a food quality standard, the European Protected Designation of 
Origin (PDO), which differs from all the aforementioned standards in that it is designed to signal a 
more immaterial dimension of quality, namely “terroir” - meaning some tradition, authenticity and 
typicity derived from a combination of natural conditions (soil, climate…) and accumulated know-
how in a given place of origin. As defined by EU Regulation 510/2006, the PDO standard 
designates a product originating from a specific region, and "the quality or characteristics of which 
are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent 
natural and human factors, and the production, processing and preparation of which take place in 
the defined geographical area". How this standard should be met in practice is not described in the 
EU regulation. Details on its implementation are defined in product specifications, which are 
different for each of the European PDOs (there are currently over 500). In practice, this legal 
framework allows for a lot of flexibility on production and processing rules. A recurring element of 
the general debate about geographical indications (GIs) is whether, in short, they are a relevant 
quality signal or an abusive rent for producers (see notably Josling, 2006).  
The preamble to the EU Regulation gives the political view of Europe on this matter, stating 
that PDO protection is beneficial both for consumers and producers: For consumers, by giving 
them information regarding the origin of products and by making available high-quality products 
with guarantees as to the method of production and origin; for producers, by helping to secure 
higher incomes in return for a genuine effort to improve quality, and by retaining rural population 
in less-favored or remote areas. In practice, the way the PDO system is applied does not appear to 
guarantee a link between a geographical name and high quality (Lucatelli, 2000). Benefits for 
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consumers depend on the extent to which natural factors and accumulated know-how in the place 
of origin actually do confer some specific quality attributes on products; the extent to which the 
reputation provided by GIs help producers to improve their quality; and the extent to which 
consumers intrinsically value the fact that production took place in a given area with given methods 
of production, independent of the quality attained. In the worst-case scenario, where no pre-
established link exists between quality and territory and where producers granted with a GI do not 
undertake genuine efforts to improve quality, consumers may be misled by the label, which could 
wrongly suggest to them that localization confers special qualities on the product, while it actually 
just helps producers in the agro-food chain to capture undue rents. 
In the theoretical economic literature, GIs are usually modeled as a signal of high quality in a 
vertical differentiation context. In some papers, the high quality of the GI good is exogenous and its 
existence precedes that of the label. The GI certification aims at informing consumers on this 
quality level, which they cannot assess in the absence of this label (Marette, Crespi and Schiavina, 
1999; Marette and Crespi, 2003; Zago and Pick, 2004). Alternatively, some authors assume that GI 
producers have the ability to produce an exogenously high level of quality only if they invest the 
fixed costs of quality improvement. Given imperfect information, the GI standard gives them the 
incentive to invest in quality (Lence et al., 2007; Mérel, 2009). In other papers, GI producers face a 
competitive market of low-quality products and strategically choose the high quality level of the GI 
product (Moschini, Menapace and Pick, 2008; Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 2010; Mérel 
and Sexton, 2012). Finally, Menapace and Moschini (2012) use a dynamic model of reputation 
with endogenous quality choice in competitive markets. Producers within a region with distinctive 
“terroir” features may use GI certification and/or private trademarks in order to establish a 
reputation of high quality. They compete with producers using a standard technology, who may 
only use private trademarks.  
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This literature addresses the welfare implications of GI labeling in a context of asymmetric 
information (for a survey, see Teuber, Anders and Langinier, 2011). Some studies investigate GIs 
as a way of direct or indirect supply control. They find that allowing GI producers to collude may 
improve general welfare by enabling these producers to cover the fixed costs of quality 
development and certification (Marette, Crespi and Schiavina, 1999; Marette and Crespi, 2003; 
Zago and Pick, 2004; Lence et al., 2007; Mérel, 2009). Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban (2010) 
investigate whether producers with a quality advantage should collectively choose a GI 
certification (modeled as entailing variable certification costs) or a private common label (entailing 
fixed certification costs). Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008) differ in their approach, by showing 
that GI labeling is compatible with a competitive provision of quality with free entry. In this 
competitive context, they also find that GI labeling may improve welfare. Mérel and Sexton (2012) 
investigate a situation in which GI producers are able to collude on quality choice, but not on 
quantities. They find that GI producers may end up supplying a higher level of quality than the 
welfare-maximizing one. Menapace and Moschini (2012) show that GI certification, acting as a 
tool for collective reputation, improves welfare compared with a situation where only private 
trademarks would be available for firms. 
In this paper, we aim to provide additional insights on the assumption, on which all the 
aforementioned models are based, namely that there is a positive link between GIs and high 
quality. In order to do so, we step back from the sophisticated level on which some issues, such as 
direct versus indirect supply control or dynamic reputation, have been addressed in this literature. 
However, rather than assuming a direct positive link between “terroir” and high quality, we bring 
additional complexity in the link between territory and quality, both in terms of consumer 
preferences and firm technology.  
With this in mind, our paper borrows some insights from that of Crampes and Hollander 
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(1995a) on denomination or appellation standards. Their paper builds on a stylized fact about the 
harmonization of the standard for gold in the EU, which has led France to reduce the number of 
karats that a metal has to contain in order to be called “gold”. The authors examine how relaxing 
this standard affects producers and consumers. They model the appellation standard as certifying 
that quality is at least equal to a given threshold. They adopt a vertical differentiation framework 
where consumers value the intrinsic quality level of the good they consume, as well as the presence 
of a label on this good, and where a firm that has adopted the standard competes with a low-quality 
firm that has not. The authors show that relaxing the denomination standard benefits high-quality 
producers. As in their model, we adopt here some assumptions on how consumers derive utility 
from both the existence of the PDO label signaling where the product originates from, and the 
actual taste of the product. Our paper also relates to the analysis of Chambolle and Giraud-Héraud 
(2005), who model quality choices by two firms, one of which can adopt a label of origin, while the 
other cannot. Their analysis differs from ours in that they assume that the labeled firm must commit 
itself to quantity restrictions in order to benefit from the label (we do not model any capacity 
constraint linked with PDO labeling). More generally, our article builds on the industrial 
organization literature on endogenous quality choice (notably Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Motta, 
1993; Lambertini, 1996).  
In our model, drawing from this literature, we derive endogenous quality choice both by a 
firm that may pretend to PDO labeling and by one which cannot put forward the necessary 
traditional know-how to benefit from PDO labeling. We compare equilibria with no label and with 
a PDO label, distinguishing between two extreme cases: either the PDO label only guarantees the 
origin of the product; or it guarantees both the origin and the final quality of the product. We also 
analyze an extension of this duopoly model in which producer organizations choose the quality for 
each good and in which a competitive equilibrium with atomistic producers arises once qualities 
 6 
are chosen.  
 
Do PDO product specifications reflect terroir attributes? The examples of the comté and 
cantal French cheeses 
EU Regulation 510/2006 stipulates that each PDO must comply with a product specification 
that should include details which bear out the link between the quality or characteristics of the 
product and the particular geographical environment it originates from, with its inherent natural and 
human factors. In practice, PDOs are very heterogeneous with respect to the content and the degree 
of precision of their product specifications. A reason for this heterogeneity is that each product 
specification reflects a local balance of power, as the decision process for PDO creation or 
evolution devotes a central place to professional organizations (Ansaloni and Fouilleux, 2008). 
Below we illustrate this heterogeneity of product specifications, through time and between 
products, with the example of two French AOC cheeses, comté and cantal.1 Comté dominates AOC 
cheese sales in France by far, with 25% of volumes sold on that market in 2010. Cantal is the 
fourth French AOC cheese with almost 8% in 2010 (INAO/CNAOL, 2011).2 Both cheeses are 
regional products with very ancient origins (comté, from the East of France, and cantal, from the 
center of France). Both were recognized as AOC by courts in the 1950s after their local craft 
unions respectively initiated lawsuits against grocers selling cheeses, which originated from outside 
the traditional production area, as “comté” and “cantal”. 
The 1952 court decision for comté, which put forward evidence of the long tradition of comté 
production in the region, delimitated the area of authorized production and specified that AOC 
comté cheese should be produced in accordance with local, loyal and consistent customs; and 
notably also come from local cow breeds, fed according to customs codified in the statutes of the 
local cheese dairies. The initial decree of the Comté AOC, published in 1958, imposed only the 
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area of authorized production and the condition that it should be produced “in accordance with 
local, loyal and consistent customs”. Gradually, other rules have been introduced on milk 
production and processing, as summarized in the Appendix (Table A1).  
The main current rules for milk production are the obligation to use local cow breeds; the 
prohibition of the use of silage; a limitation on livestock and milk production per hectare; and a 
limitation on feed concentrate. For processing, the main current rules are the obligation to collect 
milk near the production point and the duration of cheese ripening. 
Colinet et al. (2006) provide a detailed analysis of this product specification. In short, 
currently the obligations imposed by the comté PDO specification do not appear to be very 
restrictive for farmers. In fact, on the whole, the levels of compliance observed in the PDO area 
remain well within the requirements of the regulation, just as much for the producers of comté milk 
as for local producers of other milks. Thus, the product specification records and sets the rules of 
production of the existing regional extensive dairy farming model.  
The first decree of the cantal AOC was published in 1980, long after a 1956 court decision 
recognized the AOC. This decree only instituted a minimum of 45 days of cheese ripening 
(decreased to 30 days in 1986) and a few details concerning the temperature and length of certain 
manufacturing stages (INAO, 1980 and 1986). Yet, the 1956 court decision that ruled in favor of 
the cantal AOC insisted on the significance of every constitutive detail of the cantal terroir, notably 
the volcanic ground, the special local flora, the rustic cow breeds, the transhumance and estive, and 
the traditional manufacturing (see the appendix Table A2). A new specification, adopted in 2007 
after a lengthy process and under pressure from the French institute for AOCs, instituted a series of 
precise rules at the production, processing and ripening stages. The specifications are not 
completely in line with the initial description of the cantal terroir in the 1956 court ruling. Dairy 
and cheese production practices in the area have actually evolved a lot in the meantime, and no 
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longer match the initial description of the cantal terroir. Cantal milk production, initially limited to 
the mountain area during estive, has developed in a peneplain area contained in the AOC area,  
with more intensive milk production methods based on corn silage; intensive Holstein cattle has 
partly replaced the initial Salers and Aubrac rustic breeds; while processing has industrialized 
(Colinet et al., 2007).  
A detailed evaluation of the extent to which the comté and cantal decrees have been and are 
currently binding for local farms, and the extent to which required specifications confer special 
characteristics on the final product, is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purpose of our 
analysis, it is of interest to point out two elements shown by that these examples. First, the 
restrictiveness of production/processing specifications varies among PDOs and across time for a 
given PDO. Second, while the EU PDO Regulation requires that the quality or characteristics of the 
PDO product are “essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its 
inherent natural and human factors”, our examples show that the extent to which actual PDO 
specifications convey a specific terroir varies in practice. 
 
Theoretical framework and benchmark equilibrium with no labeling 
We adopt a model that draws on standard features of the vertical differentiation literature. We 
consider two goods: a “labelable” good, denoted a, which may pretend to PDO labeling; and a 
“non-labelable” good, denoted b, for which no PDO labeling is possible. The economic literature 
assumes either that both the high and low quality levels are exogenous (Marette, Crespi and 
Schiavina, 1999; Zago and Pick, 2004), or that only the high quality (enjoying a GI) is endogenous 
(Moschini, Menapace and Pick, 2008; Menapace and Moschini, 2012; Mérel and Sexton, 2012). In 
our framework we assume that the quality levels of both labelable and non-labelable goods are 
endogenous. For our purpose, we consider two extreme alternative implementations of the PDO 
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label. We call the PDO label a “denomination standard” (DS) if PDO specifications require that 
every production step takes place within a given area, but do not induce any effective quality 
constraint. Therefore, the labelable good may be granted a denomination standard label whatever 
its quality level, departing from the usual assumption that the PDO label signals a high level of 
quality. Alternatively, we call the PDO label a “minimum quality requirement” (MQR) when PDO 
specifications impose both local production and binding quality requirements, so that the final 
product meets at least some given quality level.  
In models on geographical indications, typically the quality level is one-dimensional and the 
high-quality good is a credence good.3 We distinguish two attributes of goods: gustatory quality 
and geographic origin. Gustatory quality of good i is a one-dimensional continuous vertical 
attribute labeled by qi (the higher qi, the better the taste of good i). In the usual classification of 
search, experience or credence attributes (Nelson 1970, Darby and Karni 1973), taste is typically an 
experience attribute, known only after purchase. However, for a product purchased repeatedly, 
which is the usual case with food products, consumers have an idea of its taste before purchase (as 
long as the product is identifiable, for example by trademark, and its taste is stable enough over 
time). In our one-period model, we handle this gustatory quality as a search attribute (detected 
before purchase). We leave out any informational problems related to this gustatory quality, 
assuming, as in Menapace and Moschini (2012), that firms can identify their products by 
trademarks at no cost. By contrast, we assume that consumers are not able to discern whether the 
good originates from a particular area and, therefore, the attribute of geographic origin is a 
credence attribute, which can be revealed only by public labeling.  
Consumers purchase a single unit of one of the two goods, or nothing. Their utility is additive 
in the two attributes of the good. They differ in the intensity of their preference for gustatory 
quality, measured by a parameter θ distributed uniformly on the interval [ ,θ θ ], with ̅  	   . 
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They have identical preferences for geographical origin, measured by a same parameter g for all 
consumers. The utility derived from a positive consumption of one of the two goods is given by: 
(1) θ	
  
   	 θ		
  			 
,  
where L is a dummy variable defined as:  
1 for the labelable good if it is labeled as PDO,
0 otherwise.
L

= 

 
This formulation assumes that consumers value the origin of the labelable good only if the 
origin is certain, that is, if this good is actually labeled. Analogously to Crampes and Hollander 
(1995a), we assume that all consumers derive the same utility from the origin; but contrary to these 
authors, in order to simplify matters, we do not assume that the utility attached to the origin 
depends on the gustatory quality of the good. Contrary to the usual assumption of the literature on 
geographical indications, we assume here that consumers attach an intrinsic utility to the origin of 
the good. This assumption conveys the idea that the PDO label has acquired a collective reputation 
through time, which may confer some “status” characteristic on a good bearing this label.4 
Alternatively, it may be viewed as consumers being altruistic and considering PDO purchase as 
contributing to a public good, such as the maintenance of rural activity and traditional production 
(although we do not model such a public good in our welfare function). 
For tractability reasons, we adopt the usual assumption of the literature on endogenous 
quality choices, namely that there exists only one producer of each good, with both firms playing a 
two-stage game, choosing quality levels first, and then prices. Besides, we make no a priori 
assumption on which firm produces the low or the high quality good. In models on geographical 
indications, the considered producers are usually farmers who behave competitively. In this 
literature, PDO producers are capable of collectively choosing the quality level of the PDO 
product. They do not have the power to set prices, but they may have the power to control supply, 
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either directly or indirectly, by controlling the amount of farmland or by introducing production 
practices that reduce output (such as stipulating maximum yields, or the maximum stocking rate of 
cows per hectare…). Our assumption of one firm per product, with strategic behavior both with and 
without labeling, applies to the processing stage of PDOs, where there is often market power, rather 
than to the farm stage. In that sense, our model can be viewed as an extreme case, in which 
processors have integrated farmers vertically. We relax our duopoly assumption in the last section, 
in which we simulate a game with competition at the second stage. 
To be able to reach analytical solutions in our model, we first study the case in which the 
market is covered and in which both firms have identical cost functions.5 We assume that fixed 
costs of production are zero, while variable costs of production are constant in quantity (xi) and 
quadratic in quality (qi): 
 (2) Ci(xi, qi) = c qi² xi 
where c is the cost parameter.6  
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we then use simulations to analyze the case 
of an uncovered market, possibly with a cost disadvantage for the firm producing the non-labelable 
good. When it exists, we assume that this cost disadvantage occurs through a fixed cost born by 
firm b only. This fixed cost (f) may be thought of as an investment cost to acquire knowledge about 
how to produce the high-quality good or dedicated infrastructures.7 In this extension, the total cost 
function for firm b is written as:  
(3) Cb(xb, qb) = (c xb+ f) qb². 
We now analyze the benchmark equilibrium in which the labelable good is not labeled, with 
a covered market and symmetric cost functions. In the absence of labeling, consumers get no utility 
from the origin attribute. Results of this benchmark case are identical to those derived by Cremer 
and Thisse (1994) and Lambertini (1996).  
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Consumer θ gets a utility θ qi - pi when consuming good i = {l, h}, where indexes l and h 
denote respectively the low and the high qualities. The consumer that is indifferent between the 
low-quality or the high-quality product is characterized by  	 	 		 . When the market is 
covered, the demand for the low-quality product is  	 while the demand for the high-quality 
product is ̅ 		. There exist two duopoly equilibria with a covered market generated by 
switching the role of both firms (depending on whether the labelable good is the high-quality or the 
low-quality good). In equilibrium, we obtain the standard results of the literature (Cremer and 
Thisse, 1994; Lambertini, 1996), stating that the market is differentiated, and that both firms sell 
the same quantities and obtain the same profit (Table 1). These results hold as long as 	  	 or 
equivalently, 	   (covered market condition). 
Insert Table 1. 
This symmetry in equilibrium quantities and profits follows from the covered market 
assumption and is lost when we simulate the case of an uncovered market. In these simulations, we 
assume that    and c =  , and we make three alternative assumptions on the cost disadvantage 
for firm b: the firm producing the non-labelable good has no cost disadvantage (f = 0, table A3 in 
the Appendix), a small cost disadvantage (   , table A4) or a high cost disadvantage (   , 
table A5). In these simulations, we obtain the intuitive result that when this cost disadvantage is 
absent or low, two duopoly equilibria exist, with the labelable good being either the high-quality or 
the low-quality good; while there is only one equilibrium, in which the labelable good is the high-
quality good, when its rival incurs a high cost disadvantage.  
 
PDO Labeling by a Denomination Standard 
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We now turn to the equilibrium with labeling by first examining the case of the denomination 
standard, where the PDO label only indicates the geographical origin, while product specifications 
stating how the PDO good must be produced do not impose any effective production constraint. 
We assume that when choosing to certify its product, the firm producing the labelable good incurs 
a fixed cost of certification FDS, which we model as independent of the quality level.8  
From equation (1), the utility from consuming the labeled good is θ qa + g , while the utility 
from consuming the non-labeled good is θ qb. The marginal consumer who is indifferent between 
the two goods, is characterized by !"  #$%#$ 	. Proposition 1 below describes the effects of 
labeling (proof is given in the Appendix and equilibrium values are described in table 2). 
 
Proposition 1. Denomination standard versus no labeling 
• Assume that the following conditions hold: 
- It is profitable for firm a to label its good: &!" '	%()	%*+, , 
- The market is covered:     -()% , 
- At equilibrium both firms operate on the market: 16 c g < 9. 
Then,  
1.A. Two alternative duopoly equilibria with labeling may emerge, depending on whether the 
labeled good is the high-quality good or the low-quality good. If the labelable good is the high-
quality good, the introduction of a denomination standard lowers quality levels and prices. 
Opposite effects are obtained if the labelable good is the low-quality good.  
1.B. The introduction of a denomination standard causes the profit of the non-PDO firm to 
decrease whereas the profit of the PDO firm increases. Consumers’ surplus increases. Total 
welfare increases. 
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• The results 1.A and 1.B hold when the market is non-covered with   , .	  , 	    and 
 / 0    1, except that if the cost disadvantage is high (   , only the duopoly 
equilibrium with the high quality labeled good emerges.  
Insert Table 2. 
 Labeling increases the utility provided by the labelable good without changing its production 
cost function. The first effect is to shift out the demand curve for the labelable good while shifting 
in the demand curve for the non-labelable good. Therefore, we obtain the intuitive result that the 
profit of the PDO firm increases while the profit of the non-PDO firm decreases with the 
introduction of the PDO label, with an increase in total profit. With the assumption that prior to 
labeling, consumers derive no utility to the origin of the labelable good, logically their surplus 
increases with labeling introduction, and total welfare increases too.  
The denomination standard is a signal of origin, but does not impose a quality standard. In 
this setting, we find that there is a priori no reason for the labeled good to be of a higher or a lower 
gustatory quality than the non-labeled good, except if the firm producing the non-labelable good 
bears a high disadvantage cost (   ). This is in contrast with usual assumption of the literature 
that the PDO good is necessarily a high-quality good. This is also in contrast with the Preamble of 
the European PDO regulation, which, as mentioned in the introduction, associates a notion of high 
quality with the PDO. Besides, we obtain that gustatory qualities are lowered by the label 
introduction when the PDO good is the high-quality good. This result once again contradicts the 
preamble of the European PDO regulation, which views the PDO as encouraging quality 
improvement for producers.  
The intuition for gustatory quality effects in Proposition 1 is as follows: As labeling is 
introduced, consumers derive utility from the geographical origin. This induces the firm producing 
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the labeled good to relax its differentiation with the other firm with respect to the other attribute, 
that is, gustatory quality. Bringing its gustatory quality closer to that of the other firm results in a 
smaller qa when qa > qb, and a greater qa when qa < qb. On the contrary, the firm producing the non-
labeled good has an incentive to maintain its gustatory quality differentiation with the other firm, as 
consumers value only the gustatory quality of the non-labeled good. Preserving this differentiation 
results in a drop in qb when qa > qb and an increase of qb when qa < qb. 
Figure 1 illustrates these behaviors in terms of shifts in first-stage reaction functions, which 
show how each firm determines its optimal quality level, given the quality level chosen by the 
other firm (the analytical expressions of these reaction functions are given in the appendix). If the 
labelable good is the high-quality good (qa>qb), the introduction of labeling causes both reaction 
functions to shift in, and the equilibrium to feature lower qualities for both goods. On the contrary, 
if the labelable good is the low-quality good (qa<qb), the introduction of labeling causes both 
reaction functions to shift out, and the equilibrium to exhibit higher qualities for both goods.  
Insert figure 1. 
 
PDO Labeling with a Minimum Quality Requirement 
Actual PDO certification guarantees the fulfillment of requirements on production methods, 
but not output quality. We study here the extreme case where all production practices have to be 
maintained on at least their initial level when the PDO label is introduced; thereby assuring that the 
PDO labeling does not lower the quality level. In this particular case, the PDO specifications on 
production methods are equivalent to a minimum quality requirement. Therefore, in this section, 
we assume that the PDO firm gets the PDO label only if its quality level is at least the quality of the 
no-label case. We study the case where the labelable good is the high-quality good, because it is the 
only case where the minimum quality requirement is binding. The firm producing the labelable 
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good incurs a fixed cost of certification, independent of the quality level, denoted FMQR. We assume 
that FMQR > FDS: it is more costly to certify both production specifications and geographical origin 
than to certify origin only. Proposition 2 compares the equilibrium with a minimum quality 
requirement to the equilibrium with denomination standard. Our results are described in Table 2. 
Proposition 2. Minimum quality requirement versus denomination standard 
• Assume that the following conditions hold: 
− The PDO firm gets a higher profit level with the MQR than in the absence of 
label2 &345 ' ,(	)%,-*	,*(	)	%6+*-	)	%+	)	 . 
− The market is covered: 787	.	̅    9̅̅  :;67  <:	.		  =	̅>  7̅  ?, 
− At equilibrium both firms operate on the market: 64 c g < 81, 
2.A The quality level of the non-PDO good is higher with a minimum quality requirement than with 
a denomination standard. 
2.B The profit of the PDO firm, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower with a minimum 
quality requirement than with a denomination standard. When the intensity of preferences for the 
origin is small enough (24 c g < 9), the non-PDO firm obtains a higher profit with a minimum 
quality requirement than with a denomination standard; otherwise, comparison of profit levels is 
indeterminate.  
• Assume now that the market is non-covered with   , .	  , 	    and   0    1: 
The former results still hold, except that consumer surplus is higher with a minimum quality 
requirement than with a denomination standard, when the non-labelable firm bears a 
disadvantage cost (     ). 
 
In order to benefit from the geographical indication, the labelable firm now has to meet the 
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minimum standard requirements. This leads to an increase of its own quality level and also of the 
quality level of the non labelable firm, compared with the case of the denomination standard. A 
main result for our purpose is that the firm producing the labeled good has no interest in this 
strengthening of the quality requirement. This result reinforces the findings of Crampes and 
Hollander (1995a). These authors study the effects of changing the requirement level for a 
denomination standard already in use. They find that an increase in the minimum quality 
requirement causes the profit of the firm that already met the standard to decrease. From the 
consumer’s point of view, they find that all consumers lose from a strengthening in the standard; 
we obtain the analogous result that consumer surplus is smaller if production requirements for the 
PDO label are binding when the two firms have the same cost function. Nevertheless, we show that 
consumers can be better off with a minimum quality requirement than with a denomination 
standard when the market is uncovered and the non-labelable firm bears a cost disadvantage.9 
Our result that the PDO firm obtains a lower profit level with a minimum quality requirement 
than with a denomination standard appears to contradict the observation that some PDO producer 
associations reinforce their product specifications through time (as detailed above for the examples 
of comté and cantal). A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the 
reinforcement of product specifications observed for some PDOs does not necessarily aim at 
improving the final quality of the product. As stressed by Menapace and Moschini (2012), 
certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. 
Actual reinforcements of product specifications may aim at improving the image of the product (so 
long as consumers know about these changes, which may be the case through communication and 
advertising), thereby acting on the parameter g, which describes the utility attached to the PDO 
label of the product, rather than on the utility attached to its gustatory quality. An increase in g 
resulting from the shift from a denomination standard to a minimum quality requirement may raise 
 18
the profit of the labeled firm.10 The increase in g also benefits the consumers. Alternatively, in line 
with the arguments developed by Lence et al. (2007) or Mérel (2009) for example, actual 
reinforcements of product specifications may aim at helping direct or indirect supply control 
(which is not modeled here). In particular, this may currently be the case for PDO producers of 
dairy products in the European Union, in order to counteract the effects of the abolition of milk 
quotas. For example, for cantal, limitations on concentrates may exclude some intensive farms (see 
Table A2). 
 
Alternative framework with atomistic producers 
Our assumption of duopoly is relevant for some PDO processing stages; however, a competitive 
setting may be more adequate for other PDOs. Here we relax the duopoly assumption and consider 
an alternative setting based on Mérel and Sexton (2012). We assume that two producer 
organizations set the gustatory quality of each good in the first stage of the game; in the second 
stage, within each producer organization, identical atomistic producers choose their quantities.  
For producers to obtain rents in this context, marginal costs must increase with quantities. 
Additionally, to obtain finite quality levels, the elasticity of total cost with respect to quality must 
be higher than its elasticity with respect to quantity (see Proposition 1 in Mérel and Sexton, 2012). 
We choose the following total cost function for good i, which satisfies both properties: 
(4) Ci(xi, qi) = c qi3 xi2. 
We simulate the equilibria with no labeling, with a denomination standard and with a 
minimum quality requirement, assuming that   , .	   and 	   . The results are shown in 
table A6. We find that all the results obtained in propositions 1 and 2 with a covered market still 
hold. In other words, our results are robust to the assumption of competitive versus strategic 
behavior at the second stage of the game in these simulations. 
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Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of PDO labeling when quality choices are endogenous and when no 
a priori assumption is made regarding the relative quality levels of the labelable and non-labelable 
goods. Our model distinguishes two attributes of goods: gustatory quality and geographic origin.  
We find that the labeled good may be the high-quality or the low-quality good. This result 
gives an additional perspective on PDOs when compared with the theoretical literature, which 
usually assumes that PDO is a high quality label. Geographical indication may encourage or 
discourage quality improvement. If the labelable good is the high-quality one, the introduction of 
labeling causes its quality level to decrease if the regulator authorizes PDO labeling without 
imposing product specifications that introduce binding requirements on the quality level. The 
introduction of a denomination standard is a source of profit for the PDO firm and welfare gains for 
consumers, whereas the non-PDO firm is worse off. When such a PDO labeling is already in use, 
the PDO firm loses if a binding minimum quality requirement is introduced; unless this new 
regulation increases the utility consumers derive from the geographic origin. These results are 
robust to the alternative assumption of uncovered market. They also hold with a cost disadvantage 
for the firm producing the non-labelable good (except that when this cost disadvantage is high, the 
PDO firm is necessarily the high-quality producer). They are also robust to the alternative 
assumption of a competitive framework at the second stage of the game. 
In accordance with the view developed by European regulators in the PDO legislation, 
theoretical economic models have so far considered GIs as a high-quality label. Yet, and probably 
more so than for any other food label, PDO products are very heterogeneous, in the sense that 
product specifications associated with the label are uniquely defined for each PDO product. 
Therefore, while every GI indicates an origin, the information provided on gustatory quality is far 
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more diverse. We aimed at illustrating this heterogeneity by building a model in which different 
PDO quality levels may emerge in equilibrium. A main feature of this model is that it distinguishes 
the origin and quality attributes of PDO goods. The origin attribute is kept simple here: we assume 
that every consumer gives the same valuation to the origin of the labeled good, whatever its 
gustatory quality. Further insights on the PDOs could probably be obtained with more complex and 
realistic assumptions on consumers’ preferences with regard to the origin, where the higher the 
quality level, the more consumers value the geographic origin, and/or where valuations of origin 
differ among consumers. 
 
References 
Ansaloni M., and E. Fouilleux. 2008. “Terroir et Protection de l’Environnement : Un Mariage 
Indésirable ? A Propos d’Intégration de Critères Environnementaux dans un Instrument de 
Politique Agricole.” Politiques et Management Public 26(4):3-24. 
Bouamra-Mechemache, Z., and J. Chaaban. 2010. “Protected Designation of Origin Revisited.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization 8(1), Article 5:1-27. 
Chambolle, C. and E. Giraud-Héraud. 2005. “Certification of Origin as a Non-Tariff Barrier.” 
Review of International Economics 13:461-471. 
Colinet, P., M. Desquilbet, D. Hassan, S. Monier-Dilhan, V. Orozco, and V. Réquillart.  2006. 
“Economic Analysis of Food Quality Assurance Scheme: Case study Comté.” European 
Technico-Economic Policy Support Network. Brussels. 
Colinet, P., M. Desquilbet, and D. Hassan. 2007. L’AOC Cantal : Une Etude Economique. 
Unpublished, INRA ESR Toulouse.  
Council of the European Union. 2006. “Council Regulation (EC) N° 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 
on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural 
 21
Products and Foodstuffs.” Official Journal of the European Communities L 93:12-25. 
Crampes, C., and A. Hollander. 1995a. “How Many Karats is Gold: Welfare Effects of Easing a 
Denomination Standard.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 7:131-143. 
Crampes, C., and A. Hollander. 1995b. “Duopoly and Quality Standards.” European Economic 
Review 39:71-82. 
Cremer, H., and J.F. Thisse. 1994. “Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly.” 
International Economic Review 35:613-633. 
Darby, M., and E. Karni. 1973. “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud.” Journal of 
Law and Economics 16:67-88. 
Deselnicu, O., M. Costanigro, D.M. Souza-Monteiro, and D. T. McFadden. 2011. “A Meta-
Analysis of Geographical Indication Food Valuation Studies: What Drives the Premium for 
Origin Based Labels?” Working Paper n°93, American Association of Wine Economists. New 
York. 
Grossman, J.M., and C. Shapiro. 1988. “Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 103:79-100. 
Josling, T. 2006. “The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict.” 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 57:615-641. 
Lambertini, L. 1996. “Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products.” 
Australian Economic Papers 35:205-224. 
Lence, S., S. Marette, D. Hayes, and W. Foster. 2007. “Collective Marketing Arrangements for 
Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89: 947-963. 
Lucatelli, S. 2000. “Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications in OECD Member 
Countries: Economic and Legal Implications.” OCDE, Directorate for food, agriculture and 
 22
fisheries, trade directorate.  
Marette, S., and J.M. Crespi. 2003. “Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?” Review of 
Industrial Organization 23:43-64. 
Marette, S., Crespi J.M., and A. Schiavina. 1999. “The Role of Common Labelling in a Context of 
Asymmetric Information.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 26:167-178.  
Menapace, L., and G. Moschini. 2012. “Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, 
Trademarks and Firm Reputation.” European Review of Agricultural Economics, in press. 
Mérel, P. 2009. “On the Deadweight Cost of Production Requirements for Geographically 
Differentiated Agricultural Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91:642-655. 
Mérel, P., and R. Sexton. 2012. “Will Geographical Indications Supply Excessive Quality?” 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, in press. 
Moschini, G., L. Menapace, and D. Pick. 2008. “Geographical Indications and the Competitive 
Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
90:794-812. 
Motta, M. 1993. “Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs Quantity Competition.” Journal of 
Industrial Economics 41:113-132. 
Nelson, P. 1970. “Information and Consumer Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 78:311-329. 
Ronnen, U. 1991. “Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition.” Rand Journal of 
Economics 22:490-504. 
Teuber, R., S. Anders, and C. Langinier. 2011. “The Economics of Geographical Indications: 
Welfare Implications.” Working Paper 2011-6, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and 
Agri-products Industry Network, Quebec. 
Tavoularis, G., F. Recours, and P. Hebel. 2007. “Perception de la Qualité et des Signes Officiels de 
Qualité dans le Secteur Alimentaire.” Cahier de Recherche n° 236, Centre de Recherche pour 
 23
l’Etude et l’Observation des Conditions de Vie. Paris. 
Zago, A.M., and D. Pick. 2004. “Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public 
Intervention, and Welfare Effects.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 29:150-
165.  
 24
Table 1. Duopoly Equilibrium without a geographical indication 
 	@  A̅  7	.  
	B  A̅  	C7	.  
@  A̅    	:A=A	.  
B  A̅  	C  	:A=A	.  
  ̅  : 
Consumer Surplus DE  =	F 		F 	  	:9=A	.  
Profit G@  9=. 
Profit GB  9=. 
Total Welfare H  =	F 		F 	  	=A	.  
Note: There exist two symmetric equilibria, depending on whether product a is of high quality (h) 
or of low quality (l). The superscript 0 denotes the equilibrium value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Duopoly Equilibria with a Geographical Indication 
 
 
Denomination Standard, 
qa < qb 
Denomination Standard, 
qa > qb 
Minimum Quality Requirement 
 
	I  	B  :9 	@  :9 	@  
	J  	@  :9 	B  :9 	B  67  <:.  <:A.  	J!" 
I  B  7 :̅  7.  9
 
@  7 :̅  7.  <
 
@  A<  67  <:.  <A7.  
J  @  7 :̅  7.  <
 
B  7 :̅  7.  9
 
@  <  ̅  67  <:.  <:A.  
  K  7< 	.	 K  7< 	.	 K 67  <:.  <7  
Consumer 
Surplus DE  DE 
CA :L  7	. DE  CA :L  7	. DE  9  =A	.  767  <:.  <C7A.  
Profit GI  G  =.  7:L  &!" G  =.  7:L  &!" G  A<  =A	.  :L67  <:.  <:C<:.  &345 
Profit GJ  G  =.  7:L  G  =.  7:L  G  A<  =A	.  :L67  <:.  <:C<:.  
Total Welfare W H  :  :7	.	:L  &!" H  :  :7	.	:L  &!" H  9  9:	.  :L67  <:.  <C7A.  &345 
 
 
Figure 1. Equilibria in the Quality Space 
If qa > qb  
 
If qa < qb 
 
Note:  qik(qj) is a reaction function while qik is an equilibrium value, i, j = a, b, in an equilibrium 
with no labeling (k=0) or with a denomination standard (k=DS).  
qa0(qb) 
qaDS qa0  
qb 
qa 
qbDS(qa) 
qbDS 
qb0 
qaDS(qb) 
qb0(qa) 
qaDS qa0  
qb 
qa 
qbDS(qa) 
qa0(qb) 
qbDS 
qb0 
qaDS(qb) 
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Appendix. 
Table A1. Evolution of the specifications of the Comté AOC: Additional rules added by successive decrees 
 1986  1998  2007 
Milk 
production 
 
− Cows must belong to the 
Montbéliarde or French 
Simmental breeds 
− Silage and other fermented feed 
are prohibited 
 
− Stocking rate limited to one cow per 
hectare of grassland pasture 
− Less than 30% of the total dry matter of 
feed must originate from concentrates 
− Two milkings per day are mandatory 
− Production limited to 4,600 litres 
−  Stocking rate limited to 1.3 
livestock units per hectare of 
main fodder area 
− Farm comté is forbidden (comté 
must be produced mixing milks 
from different farms) 
Cheese dairy 
processing 
− Cheese from raw milk 
− Regulations on the duration and 
temperatures of the various 
processing stages 
 
Milk has to be collected within a radius of 
25 kilometers 
Size limits to cheese dairies are 
introduced 
Ripening Minimum of 90 days of cheese 
ripening 
 
− Minimum of 120 days of cheese 
ripening 
− Mandatory manual operations during the 
ripening stage 
 
Other changes 
− Casein plate for cheese 
identification 
− Specific labelling other than 
Comté is forbidden 
− A special exemption must be granted for 
prepacking outside the PDO area 
− Brand labelling is authorized 
  
Grated comté production is 
authorized 
 
Source: INAO 1986, INAO 1998, INAO 2007. 
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Table A2. Current specification of the cantal AOC: perspective with the initial terroir description and the evolution of 
production practices 
 Excerpts from the 1956 court decision having ruled out 
for the cantal AOC, according to which “cantal 
production implies a series of precise factors that occur 
together in no other region” 
Specification of the cantal AOC in the 2007 decree and 
production practices in the cantal production area in 2006 
Production 
area 
− “rather rough and rainy climate”; 
− “particular property of the volcanic grounds, rich in 
phosphoric acid, in potassium hydroxide or in 
magnesia”; 
both “contributing to the development of rich grasslands 
brightened up with a varied and original spontaneous flora 
… making for cows feeding on them a milk not only very 
fat, but also of a special taste, determining in a way a milk 
vintage particularly suitable for cantal production” 
The cantal AOC production area includes the Châtaigneraie, 
which characteristics differ from those described in the 1956 
ruling (its grounds have very few tracks of volcanism). Milk 
production there was marginal in the 1950s, but has 
developed since then, with intensive breeding methods based 
on corn silage. Châtaigneraie accounted for around 30% of 
total milk production in the AOC cantal area in 2006 (when 
around 40% of milk produced in the area went to cantal 
production with no differentiation of milk according to its 
use).  
 29 
Milk 
production 
 
− “another added important natural factor, concerning the 
bovine species, Salers and Aubrac, exclusively and 
specially adapted to the region; close breeds, rustic and 
very climate-resistant, fitted for transhumance and 
estivage”; “these two breeds, though producing less 
milk than those of the plain, do produce fatter milk, and 
above all, milk of an aromatic flavor, thanks to the rich 
flora of the pastures of the Cantal massifs” 
− “The manufacturing of cantal remains subordinate to the 
breeding and feeding methods… in the sense that the 
milk used to produce cantal results only from animals 
on pastures with no other feed, so that the cheese may 
be described as a fruit of terroir because of the close and 
total union of the animal and the ground” 
− Milk for cantal AOC must be from animals born and raised 
in the AOC production area, but the specification does not 
mandate any specific breed. Many dairy farms in the cantal 
area now have only intensive Holstein cow breeds. 
− Stocking rate is limited to one cow per hectare of 
cultivated area.  
− Forage must originate from the AOC area; at least 70% of 
the daily ration of the dairy herd comes from grazed or 
preserved grass; no more than 1,800 kilograms of 
concentrates per cow and per year. These rules are 
constraining mainly for intensive farm types based on corn 
silage which represented around 45% of milk production in 
2006.  
− Farm cantal is authorized 
Cheese 
dairy 
processing 
“Manufacturing is based on very ancient processes and 
[…] cannot be realized by industrial processes, because 
it must be made on spot with still warm milk the 
collection of which, twice a day, can be made only in a 
low range”. 
− Cheese from raw or heat-treated milk 
− Regulations on the duration and temperatures of the 
various processing stages 
− In 2006 production was quite industrialized: a main player, 
the cooperative group 3A, produced around 40% of cantal 
AOC, mainly in one factory. Together the first three 
players, 3A, Lactalis and the union of cheese cooperatives 
of cantal accounted for 63% of the cantal market. 
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Ripening  
− Minimum of 30 days of cheese ripening, with three 
categories: young (30 to 60 days); “entre-deux” (middle 
age) (90 to 210 days); old (at least 240 days) 
Other   Grated cantal is authorized 
Source: Tribunal civil de Saint Flour (1956); Colinet et al. 2007; INAO 2007. 
Table A3. Equilibria with a non-covered market, ̅  ,	.          . 
 
 No Labeling* 
Denomination 
Standard, 	I ' 	J  
Denomination 
Standard, 	I  	J  
Minimum 
Quality 
Requirement 
  
	I  0.820 0.434 0.780 	@ 	= 0.820   
	J  0.399 0.858 0.365 0.381   
I  0.453 0.171 0.435 0.467   
J  0.150 0.472 0.130 0.140   
  0.376 0.395 0.357 0.368   
B@ 0.721 0.756 0.685 0.700   
Consumer Surplus CS 0.0940 0.104 0.0959 0.0958   
Profit GI  0.0328 0.0279&!" 0.0411&!" 0.0394&345   
Profit GJ  0.0243 0.0254 0.0209 0.0224   
Total Welfare W 0.151 0.1574&!" 0.1579&!" 0.1577&345   
*
 With no labeling, a symmetric equilibrium exists in which firms a and b are inverted. 
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Table A4. Equilibria with a non-covered market, ̅  ,	.           .  
 
No Labeling, 	I ' 	J  
No Labeling, 	I  	J  
Denomination 
Standard, 	I ' 	J  
Denomination 
Standard, 	I  	J  
Minimum 
Quality 
Requirement 
  
	I  M9A9 ML7< 0.373 0.754 0.789   
	J  M=7C M9A7 0.711 0.313 0.326   
I  0.116 0.442 0.132 0.427 0.456   
J  0.347 0.125 0.351 0.109 0.116   
  0.339 0.365 0.355 0.348 0.357   
B@  0.673 0.708 0.708 0.676 0.689   
Consumer Surplus CS 0.0930 0.0877 0.105 0.08967 0.08969   
Profit GI  0.0192 0.0381 0.0222&!" 0.0462&!" 0.0449&345   
Profit GJ  0.0273 0.0205 0.0187 0.0177 0.0189   
Total Welfare W 0.140 0.146 0.156&!" 0.1536&!" 0.1535&345   
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Table A5. Equilibria with a non-covered market, ̅  ,	.           . 
 
 
No Labeling, 	I  	J  
Denomination 
Standard, 	I  	J  
Minimum 
Quality 
Requirement 
  
	I  ML9A 0.706 	@  = 0.734   
	J  M::: 0.206 0.212   
I  0.429 0.419 0.442   
J  0.077 0.069 0.072   
  0.348 0.334 0.340   
B@  0.688 0.660 0.670   
Consumer Surplus CS 0.0722 0.0745 0.0746   
Profit GI  0.0499 0.0577&!" 0.0569&345   
Profit GJ  0.0129 0.0113 0.0118   
Total Welfare W 0.135 0.14347&!" 0.14341&345   
Note : with the high fixed cost for firm b, there is no equilibrium in which 	I ' 	J , in the absence of labeling or with the denomination 
standard. 
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Table A6. Equilibria with competition at the second stage of the game, with a non-covered market, ̅  ,	.       . 
 
 No Labeling* 
Denomination 
Standard, 	I ' 	J  
Denomination 
Standard, 	I  	J  
Minimum 
Quality 
Requirement 
  
	I  2.19 1.695 2.14 2.19   
	J  1.693 2.24 1.690 1.693   
I  1.50 1.09 1.47 1.52   
J  1.08 1.53 1.07 1.07   
  0.635 0.640 0.630 0.634   
B@ 0.857 0.863 0.851 0.855   
Consumer Surplus CS 1.018 0.122 0.121 0.110   
Profit GI  0.107 1.121 0.109808&!" 0.109805&345   
Profit GJ  0.119 0.105 0.117 0.119   
Total Welfare W 0.344 0.348 0.348&!" 0.347&345   
*
 With no labeling, a symmetric equilibrium exists in which firms a and b are inverted. 
 
Proof of proposition 1 
In the covered market case, demand functions are given by NI  ̅  !"  and NJ  !"   in the 
case where qa > qb, or NI  !"   and NJ  ̅  !" in the case where qa < qb. For each of the 
two possible cases (qa > qb and qa < qb), the equilibrium is solved by backward induction with 
Mathematica. For each case, a unique equilibrium satisfies the second order condition of profit (see 
table 2). The PDO firm gets a higher profit level with the denomination standard than in the 
absence of label if &!" '	%()	%*+, . The market is covered if $$ '  (case qa > qb) or #%# '
		(case qa < qb), that is, if     -()% . Both firms operate on the market if θ θ θ< <% , that 
is, if 16 c g < 9.  
At the second stage of the game, we have: 
If qa > qb,OIPJ 	I  	J    	  	J  .		I    	I 		J	JPI 	I  	J   	  	I  .		J    	I 		J	 
If qa < qb,OIPJ 	I  	J   	  	J  .		I    	I 		J		JPI 	I  	J    	  	I  .		J    	I 		J	  
At the first stage of the game, we obtain the following reaction functions: 
If qa > qb,
QRS
RT	IP		J    	U**	)	$*	VU*	)	$W	)%() 	
	JP		I    	 U*	)	#	V	)	#*	UW*	)%()
 
If qa < qb,
QRS
RT	IP		J    	U*	)	$	V		)	$*	UW	)%() 	
	JP		I    	 U**	)	#*	VU*	)	#W*	)%()
 
Results are obtained by simulations for the uncovered market case, where demand functions are 
given by NI  ̅  !"  and NJ  !"  $$ in the case where qa > qb, or NI  !"  #%#  and 
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NJ  ̅  !" in the case where qa < qb.  
Proof of proposition 2. Here we only study the case where qa > qb. The equilibrium is solved as in 
proposition 1, except that at the first stage of the game we calculate the best quality choice of firm 
b given that quality of firm a is set to 	I . 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 AOC, which stands for “Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée”, is the French equivalent of the 
European PDO. 
2
 The four main French AOC cheeses are comté, roquefort, reblochon and cantal, with respectively 
25%, 10%, 8% and almost 8% of total volumes sold on that market in 2010. 
3
 Menapace and Moschini (2012) model the high-quality good as an experience good in a dynamic 
framework, with a one-dimensional quality level. 
4
 Status goods are “goods for which the mere use or display of a particular branded product confers 
prestige on their owners, apart from any utility deriving from their function” (Grossman and 
Shapiro, 1988). An indication of the collective reputation of the PDO label is, for example, the 
results of a study on food consumption conducted in France in 2007, in which 94% of 1013 
interviewed people declared that they knew the AOC quality sign and 86% declared that they had 
confidence in food products bearing an AOC label (Tavoularis, Recours and Hebel, 2007). Besides, 
empirical studies show that, on average, geographical indications command a positive price 
premium (see the meta-analysis by Deselnicu et al., 2011). It is, however, not possible to assess to 
what extent this willingness to pay results from the higher quality of the labeled product (our 
parameter q), and to what extent it comes from a valuation of the origin (our parameter g). 
5
 Cremer and Thisse (1994) and Lambertini (1996) model endogenous quality choices with a 
covered market and variable costs functions and are able to solve their model analytically. In the 
case of a non-covered market, Motta (1993) assumes (in terms of our model's parameters) that 
  , and has to choose a numerical value for ̅ in order to solve the model. 
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6
 This assumption is identical to that of Crampes and Hollander (1995b), who support the idea that 
variable costs of quality are empirically more relevant that fixed costs of quality, as most quality 
standards pertain to materials and ingredients.  
7
 Typically models of GIs assume that the PDO product is of higher quality and therefore more 
costly to produce than the non-PDO product, but do not model cost functions covering the whole 
range of possible qualities for both products. An exception is Menapace and Moschini (2012), who 
assume that PDO producers have a comparative advantage for the production of high quality while 
non-PDO producers have a comparative advantage for the production of low quality, with all costs 
being variable costs. Their assumption is intended to cover the notion of “terroir”: “the fact that the 
nature and characteristics of the conditions of production in the GI region facilitate the attainment 
of quality”. With our assumption, “terroir” is seen as the combined result of accumulated know-
how, the reputation of the local product and specific investments, rather than natural conditions in 
the GI region.  
8
 Marette et al. (1999), Marette and Crespi (2003), Zago and Pick (2004), Lence et al. (2007) and 
Mérel (2009) consider that PDO certification entails a fixed certification cost. 
9
 This is due to the lower quality level of the non-labelable good and a better coverage of the 
market. 
10
 A sufficient condition is that X 	%Y		Z[\	]		^Y	( . 
